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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
In his Reply brief, Doms accuses Plaintiffs, inter alia, of inaccurately stating facts,
misrepresenting cases, and raising issues that were foreclosed by either the "law of the case"
or other reasons. While each of these complaints by Doms will be addressed in turn, at the
outset of this reply brief, it is important for this Court to be aware of several significant
factors. First, in its opinion remanding this case to the trial court, this Court stated:
On remand, the trial court should determine what is necessary to restore
the parties to the status quo at the time the parties entered into the contract. See
Bergstrom, 677 P.2d at 1125 (affirming rescission of contract and placing
parties in original positions by allowing recovery of payments already made
under contract). In fashioning an appropriate remedy for rescission, the rule
is equitable, and requires practicality in adjusting the rights of
the parties. How this is to be accomplished, or indeed whether
it can, is a matter which is within the discretion of the trial court
under facts found to exist by the trier of fact. The trial court
therefore has discretion to fashion an adequate and reasonable
remedy so that an aggrieved party is adequately compensated for
its loss, so long as that remedy is not duplicative.
Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 457 (Utah
1993)(citation & emphasis omitted).
Anderson v. Doms. 1999 UT App. 207, 1j 20, 984 P.2d 392, 398 ("Anderson m .

This

paragraph from the opinion states four things which Doms only grudgingly acknowledges
or refuses to recognize. First, this Court stated that rescission requires that the parties be
restored to the status quo that existed before the contract was made. Second, this Court
stated that determining what the pre-contract positions of the parties were and whether they
could be restored to those positions are issues of fact to be determined by the trier of fact.
Third, this Court impliedly recognized that no court had undertaken the determination of the

identifying the pre-contract positions of the parties or ascertaining whether those positions
could be restored. Finally, this Court gave broad discretion to the trial court in determining
whether and how the parties should be restored to their pre-contract positions. In quoting
Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave Corp.. 850 P.2d 447, 457 (Utah 1993), this Court
explicitly stated that the discretion afforded the trial court on remand included determining
"whether it [rescission] can [be accomplished]". Anderson IL 1999 UT App 207, ^ 20.
Plaintiffs contended in their opening brief that, despite this Court's directions on
remand, the trial court did not make the factual determination required of it and, thus, in this
case, no court has yet determined the pre-contract positions of the parties and whether the
parties can be restored to those positions. As Plaintiffs pointed out in their opening brief,
the trial court refused to determine the pre-contract or post-rescission positions of the parties.
In refusing to undertake the determination it was directed to make, the trial court also did not
recognize that it had been given discretion to determine whether rescission was the
appropriate remedy if the parties could not be restored to their pre-contract positions.
Additionally, in evaluating each side's arguments, this Court should be aware of its
specific directions to the trial court. This Court stated: "We therefore remand this issue to
the trial court for a determination and award to Doms of the net payments paid by him less
rental value plus interest." Anderson IL 1999 UT App 207, ^ 21 (emphasis added). Only
twice in the 25 pages of his reply brief does Doms acknowledge that this Court ordered that
he receive only 'payments paid by him\ See, Reply Brief of Defendant at 18, 19. For the
most part he simply chooses to ignore this part of the Court's opinion. In doing so, Doms,
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as he did in the trial court, seeks recovery of more than he paid - he seeks a windfall at
Plaintiffs' expense. Specifically, Doms wants to have had the exclusive right to use and
occupy Plaintiffs' land, the use of Plaintiffs' money to finance his purchase of the land, and
the use of that money without the necessity of paying interest on it - all for a period now
over twenty years. As will be shown in Point III below, such windfalls are prohibited.
Finally, Plaintiffs also wish to remind the Court that no fraud or misrepresentation
was found to have been involved in the sale of Rossi Hills. (R. 7763, 8532-52) So many of
the cases cited by both sides involve fraud by one party or the other that it is easy to lose
track of the fact that no fraud is involved in this case. In essence, both sides come to the
table with "clean hands'" and, thus, if rescission can be achieved, each deserves to be placed
as nearly as possible in his original pre-contract position.

POINT I
PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF THE CASE IS ACCURATE.
In the first section of his reply brief, Doms criticizes the accuracy of the statement of
the case in Plaintiffs' opening brief. Reply Brief of Defendant at 1-3. However, close
examination reveals that in most instances Doms is not really disputing the accuracy of the
statements made by Plaintiffs, rather he would simply prefer that the Court not consider
those statements because he argues the statements are "immaterial" to this Court's
consideration of the issues. In fact, Plaintiffs assert that those statements are vital to the
Court's consideration of the issues.

3

The Court can, and will, evaluate the materiality of the statements made by each side
so Plaintiffs will not use this valuable space to respond to Doms' claims, with one exception.
In paragraph 4 on page 2 of his reply brief, Doms indicates that title is in his name. What
Doms does not address on this issue is the title search document attached as Addendum E
to Plaintiffs' opening brief. (R. 8791) That document clearly shows that, one month before
the hearing in this matter, the records of Summit County stated that Doms owned only an
undivided one-half of the property. Doms has never sought to quiet title in his own name.

POINT II
(Reply to Defendant's Point (2))
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO EXERCISE THE DISCRETION
INVESTED IN IT WHEN DID NOT EVALUATE WHETHER THE
PARTIES COULD BE RESTORED TO THEIR PRE-CONTRACT
POSITIONS AS PREREQUISITE FOR RESCISSION.
In their opening brief Plaintiffs argued that the trial court was invested with broad
discretion in determining the pre-contract positions of the parties and whether they could be
restored to those positions. If the parties could not be restored to the pre-contract status quo,
then rescission is not possible. In response, Doms claims that the law of the case barred
Plaintiffs' argument and, even if that doctrine did not apply, the parties could be returned to
their pre-contract positions. Reply Brief of Defendant at 10. Neither of these assertions is
valid.
The law of the case doctrine does not apply to this issue. In Gildea v. Guardian Title
Co., 2001 UT 75, 31 P.3d 543, cited by Doms, the Utah Supreme Court elaborated on the
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law of the case doctrine. As articulated by the court in that case, "issues resolved b> this
court on appeal bind the trial court on remand, and generally bind this court should the case
return on appeal after remand." Gildea 2001 UT 75, ^ 9. Obviously, a prerequisite for
application of the law of the case doctrine is that a party is seeking relitigation of an issue
fully resolved by a prior appeal. See, e ^ , Gildea, 2001 UT 75, ^ 10 (wt[T]he Gildeas and
Marsh now seek to relitigate in this appeal the issue of whether their appeal in Gildea Iwas
frivolous," an issue fully resolved in the first appeal.). Two factors prevent application of
the law of the case doctrine here. First, Plaintiffs were not and are not contesting this
Court's ruling in Anderson II. Rather, it is the scope and implementation of that ruling
which Plaintiffs sought to have the trial court address. Secondly, as Doms admits, not all of
the issues raised by Plaintiffs have been adjudicated. Because of the outcome in Anderson
v. Doms. Case No. 920653-CA (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("Anderson I"), some of the issues
raised by Plaintiffs were not resolved.
In Anderson IL this Court held that the findings of the trial court did not adequately
demonstrate that Plaintiffs suffered sufficient prejudice to support a laches bar to Doms'
rescission claim and that rescission was an appropriate remedy for breach of warranty
covenant; it also ruled on issues concerning the awarding of costs and fees. Anderson IL
1999 UT App 207, ^j 24. However, in remanding this case to the trial court, this Court stated:
On remand, the trial court should determine what is necessary to restore
the parties to the status quo at the time the parties entered into the contract. See
Bergstrom, 677 P.2d at 1125 (affirming rescission of contract and placing
parties in original positions by allowing recovery of payments already made
under contract). In fashioning an appropriate remedy for rescission, the rule
is equitable, and requires practicality in adjusting the rights of
5

the parties. How this is to be accomplished, or indeed whether
it can, is a matter which is within the discretion of the trial court
under facts found to exist by the trier of fact. The trial court
therefore has discretion to fashion an adequate and reasonable
remedy so that an aggrieved party is adequately compensated for
its loss, so long as that remedy is not duplicative.
Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 457 (Utah
1993)(citation & emphasis omitted).
Anderson IL 1999 UT App. 207, H 20, 984 P.2d at 398. Therefore, the Court stated that
rescission requires that the parties be restored to the status quo that existed before the
contract was made. Second, this Court stated that determining what the pre-contract
positions of the parties were and whether they could be restored to those positions are issues
of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. Third, this Court impliedly recognized that in
this case no court had undertaken the factual determinations of the identifying the precontract positions of the parties or ascertaining whether those positions could be restored.
Finally, this Court gave broad discretion to the trial court in determining whether and how
the parties should be restored to their pre-contract positions. Indeed, in quoting Ong InH
(U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave Corp.. 850 P.2d 447, 457 (Utah 1993), this Court explicitly stated
that the discretion afforded the trial court on remand included determining iwwhether it
[rescission] can [be accomplished]". Anderson IL 1999 UT App 207, ^ 20.
Contrary to Doms' claim, the law of the case doctrine does not apply because, unlike
the appellants in Gildea, Plaintiffs were not attempting to relitigate the holdings of this Court.
Rather, Plaintiffs contended to the trial court and in their opening brief in this cross-appeal
that despite this Court's directions on remand, the trial court did not make the factual
determination required of it and, thus, no court has yet determined the pre-contract positions
6

of the parties and whether the parties can be restored to those positions. This also meant that
the trial court did not use the discretion it had been afforded to determine whether rescission
was appropriate if the parties could not be restored to their pre-contract positions.
Doms is also incorrect in his assertion that the parties can be returned to their precontract positions. The fact that the trial court did not undertake this determination is a basis
for returning this case to the trial court to properly examine the issue as mandated by
Anderson II.
One document alone illustrates that the parties cannot be restored to their pre-contract
positions. Attached to Plaintiffs' opening brief as Addendum E is a title report dated May
25, 2000, just prior to the time that hearing on remand occurred in the trial court. That
document unequivocally states that, according to the tax rolls of Summit County, Doms
currently only possesses

wC

an undivided one-half ownership'' of the property with the

remainder of the property owned by the Plaintiffs. (R. 8791) Doms has not sought to quiet
title in his own name and therefore, Doms is unable to tender all of the property to Plaintiffs
because he does not own it all.
Doms also claims that the Plaintiffs can be restored to the status quo despite the death
of Plaintiff D.C. Anderson. Most telling is Doms' admission that this Court did not rule on
this issue in Anderson I. Reply Brief of Defendant at 13. Because the trial court did not
resolve the issue on remand after Anderson II, both sides apparently agree that the issue has
never been determined. This issue is critical to this Court's mandate to ''determine what is
necessary to restore the parties to the status quo at the time the parties entered into the
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contract." Anderson II, 1999 UT App 207, ^| 20. Only through resolution of this issue can
a court ever ascertain whether the parties can be restored to the status quo.
Finally, Doms argues that subsequent transfers to Doms should not affect the ability
of the parties to be restored to the status quo. Reply Brief of Defendant at 14-15. This
argument ignores the language of the Court's opinion. Doms argues that Plaintiffs have
miscited 50 West Broadway Assocs. v. Redevelopment Agency, 784 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1989),
and he then attempts to recast that case to permit rescission even if the parties cannot be
returned to the status quo. However, this argument ignores the clear mandate of this Court.
In Anderson II, the Court did not order rescission regardless of the positions in which that
would place the parties. Rather, the Court stated, bCOn remand, the trial court should
determine what is necessary to restore the parties to the status quo at the time the parties
entered into the contract." Anderson II, 1999 UT App 207, <[} 20. Therefore, Doms'
argument about the interpretation of 50 West Broadway is irrelevant - this Court required
that the parties be restored to their pre-contract positions.
Additionally, the argument that subsequent transfers to Doms should not affect the
ability of the parties to be restored to their pre-contract positions ignores another part of the
Court's opinion. The opinion stated: "We therefore remand this issue to the trial court for
a determination and award to Doms of the net payments paid by him less rental value plus
interest." Anderson II, 1999 UT App 207, ^j 21 (emphasis added). By ignoring this
language, Doms, as he did in the trial court, seeks recovery of more than he paid - he seeks
a windfall. He seeks return to a position better than that which he occupied before the
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contract. That is prohibited, as is more fully discussed in the next point.
Because the trial court did not undertake the determination it was ordered to make,
no court has yet determined whether the parties can be restored to the status quo at the time
the parties entered into the contract.

POINT III
(Reply to Defendant's Point (3))
THE "LAW OF THE CASE" REQUIRED THE TRIAL COURT TO
EVALUATE THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE
INDIVIDUAL PARTIES; IT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT TO DO SO.
Even if the parties could be placed in their pre-contract positions, making rescission
appropriate, Plaintiffs asserted that the trial court erroneously failed to evaluate the rights and
responsibilities of the individual parties. Doms responds by claiming that it should make no
difference what the rights and responsibilities of the individual parties are. In fact, this
argument simply perpetuates Doms' attempt to gain a windfall at the expense of Plaintiffs,
especially Plaintiff Scott.
This Court remanded "this issue to the trial court for a determination and award to
Doms of the net payments paid by him less rental value plus interest." Anderson IL 1999
UT App 207, T| 21 (emphasis added). In his reply brief Doms barely acknowledges that he
is to receive only "payments paid by him". See, Reply Brief of Defendant at 18, 19. He
simply chooses to ignore this part of the Court's opinion. In doing so, Doms, as he did in
the trial court, seeks recovery of more than he paid - he seeks a windfall.
Plaintiffs have repeatedly complained, to no avail, that Doms has not produced any
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evidence to demonstrate that he gave any value to acquire his apparently complete control
of Domcoy. It is important to note here that Plaintiffs do not seek to relitigate this Court's
conclusion that Doms is uthe successor in interest to McCoy and Domcoy." Anderson IL
2001 UTApp 2 0 7 ^ 21 n.12. What the Plaintiffs have sought to establish is whether Doms
acquired these interests by giving value for them or simply by default. If Doms gave no
value for these interests then refunding all of the payments ordered by the trial court would
result in a windfall to Doms. He would not be restored to his pre-contract position, he would
obtain a windfall and would be restored to a position that is better than his pre-contract
position. The trial court was tasked with determining the pre-contract positions of the parties
and whether they could be restored to those positions but it did not undertake that task.
(Videotape of June 29, 2000 hearing)
Cases establish that bestowing a windfall on a party is not returning the party to its
pre-contract position. See, e.g.. Decision One Mortgage Co. v. Fraley, 2000 WL 1889700
at 2 (6th Cir.) ("[T]he district court properly conditioned the [borrowers'] rescission on
repayment of the net loan principal received. Without requiring the [borrowers] to return the
net loan principal, the [borrowers] would receive a windfall and be placed in a far better
position then they were prior to the transaction."); Aames Capital Corp. v. Sather, 2000 WL
343218 at 4(Minn. Ct. App.) ("[W]e conclude equity requires the [borrowers] to repay the
interest on the loan as a condition of rescission. Allowing the [borrowers] to use the [loan]
without making interest payments would violate the statutory intent [of the Truth In Lending
Act] to return the parties to the pre-rescission status quo and would result in a significant
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windfall to the [borrowers]."); Meyer v. Feil 1985 WL 2194 at 9 (N.D. Ill.)("To permit
rescission to result in a return of Dr. Feil's investment in the corporate stock would be to
allow him to realize a substantial windfall.

That result . . . would be unfair and

inequitable.").
Doms should be restored to the position he would have occupied had he not entered
into the contract. But knowing exactly what position he will be restored to is impossible
because the trial court failed to fulfill its duties by not requiring Doms to reveal what were
"the net payments paid by him".
Additionally, the trial court should have determined the rights and responsibilities of
the Plaintiffs. In his reply brief, Doms asserts that "All four Plaintiffs should be jointly and
severally liable, and this was the ruling of the lower court. . .." Reply Brief of Defendant
at 16. In fact, no such ruling was made by the trial court. The trial court specifically refused
to determine the responsibilities of the Plaintiffs, either as a group or individually.
(Videotape of June 29, 2000 hearing). Because the estate of Plaintiff D.C. Anderson is, for
all intents and purposes, insolvent, the burden of repayment would fall on Plaintiff Scott.
If Scott is required to pay most or all of the judgment, he will clearly be placed in a position
far worse than the pre-contract status quo. Doms disregards this but this is the essence of
rescission - the parties must be restored to the positions they occupied before the contract,
not a position better or worse.
Failure of the trial court to determine the rights and responsibilities of the parties
means that it did not carry out the directive of this Court wCto determine what is necessary to
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restore the parties to the status quo at the time the parties entered into the contract."
Anderson IL 1999 UT App 207, ^ 20. This failure should be corrected by this Court to
prevent a windfall to Doms and placing a crushing burden on one of the Plaintiffs.

POINT IV
(Reply to Defendant's Point (4))
THE TRIAL COURT WAS REQUIRED TO AWARD RENT TO THE
PLAINTIFFS.

In their opening brief, Plaintiffs asserted that the trial court erred when it refused to
award Plaintiffs rent as required by the court of appeals in Anderson IL at ^J 21. In response,
Doms claims first that Plaintiffs have not marshaled the evidence to overcome the trial
court's finding of fact and second, that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to rent, presumably,
as a matter of law. As will be shown below, neither of these claims is valid and both avoid
the fact that this Court in its decision ordered that Plaintiffs receive rent for the period Doms
has occupied the property.
In Anderson II this Court stated:
In this case, Doms apparently made no improvements or changes to the
property such that the parties could not be returned to their respective
positions prior to entering into the contract. We therefore remand this issue
to the trial court for a determination and award to Doms of the net payments
paid by him less rental value plus interest.
Anderson IL 1999 UT App 207, ^ 21 (emphasis added, citation omitted). The facts which
appear earlier in the Court's opinion clearly indicate that the Court knew the property was
undeveloped u raw v land. See, e ^ , Id., at ^ 2,3. Despite this, the Court ordered Doms to
12

pay rent for the property. Notwithstanding this order, the trial court, without taking
evidence, refused to award rent.
A. Plaintiffs should not be required to marshal the evidence to nullify the trial court's
ruling.
Plaintiffs should not be required to marshal the evidence on this issue to reverse the
trial court's ruling because the "finding" is really a conclusion that is contrary to law and,
in any event, the law of the case required the trial court to award rent.
The "finding" of the trial court is really a conclusion. The trial court's "finding'' in
part states that the property was "raw ground which had never been used in any way by
Defendant Doms" and, that "the record is devoid of any basis for rent

". (R. 8951) The

former statement is not relevant to the issue of rent and the latter statement is not accurate.
In memoranda submitted to the trial court before the hearing, Plaintiffs had argued the rental
value of the property was equivalent to the interest paid on the purchase money. (R. 873638) As will be discussed below, ample authority supports that proposition as a fair way to
value property which is difficult to value. However, during the hearing, the trial court
announced its belief that "raw ground" had no value and never asked Plaintiffs what evidence
would help determine valuation. (Videotape of June 29,2000 hearing) In reality, neither side
was permitted to submit any evidence regarding valuation. Rather, Doms' counsel prepared
findings and conclusions which were accepted by the trial court stating the property was
"raw ground" and therefore rent was not appropriate. The "finding" on rent is totally
unsupported by anything in the record and is an observation of the trial judge as made
originally by Doms' counsel. In making this "finding" the trial judge did not take in account
13

that Doms had complete and exclusive use of the property for the entire duration of the
contract. No evidence or law was offered to support the "finding", therefore, it is nothing
more than a conclusion.
A finding or conclusion that is contrary to law must be stricken, even if it is supported
by substantial evidence. Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n., 916 P.2d 344. 354
(Utah 1996). Here, the "finding" is contrary both to the law of the case and to the weight of
authority, much of it cited to the trial court.
Finally, the "law of the case" mandated that the trial judge award Plaintiffs rent.1 The
Utah Supreme Court has stated, "Under the law of the case doctrine, issues resolved by this
court on appeal bind the trial court on remand and generally bind this court should the case
return on appeal after remand." Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah, 2001 UT 75, ^j 9, 31
P.3d 543. This doctrine is intended to promote "obedience of inferior courts" and "to avoid
the delays and difficulties involved in repetitious contentions and reconsiderations of rulings
on matters previously decided in the same case." Id. Here, all of the facts concerning the
nature and use of the land were known to this Court at the time of its opinion in Anderson
II and it ordered that Plaintiffs be awarded rent. Nothing in the trial court's "finding" on rent
indicates why it should be allowed to reach a conclusion contrary to that of this Court based
on the same facts and therefore, that "finding" should be reversed.

furiously, Doms' "law of the case" argument, so prevalent throughout the rest of his
brief, is absent here. Unlike Doms, who fails to explain why the doctrine should not apply
to rent, Plaintiffs have previously explained why the law of the case doctrine should not
apply to the unlitigated issues which they have raised. See Points II and III above.
14

B. Plaintiffs were entitled to rent equivalent to the interest which was paid or should have
been paid on the purchase money and taxes.
In their memoranda to the trial court and in their opening brief to this Court, Plaintiffs
urged that the appropriate measure of the rental value of the property was equivalent to the
interest on the purchase money and the taxes. In response Doms has attempted to distinguish
the cases cited by Plaintiffs. However, a myriad of other authorities support the position that
interest on purchase money and taxes are an appropriate measure of rental value and that the
use a purchaser/vendee makes of the land is not relevant to the award of rent.
The general proposition is set out in 1 George E. Palmer, The Law of Restitution, §
4.18(c), at 523-24 (1978), which states:
Frequently the purchaser under an executory land contract enters into
possession, particularly where it is a long-term contract, and this raises a
question as to his accountability for the value of the use of the property. It is
agreed that the purchaser is in some manner accountable, but different
formulas have been used in adjusting the rights of the parties. Sometimes the
purchaser recovers all of his payments, presumably with interest from the
times of payment, but rental value is found and deducted from the recovery.
Frequently, interest on the agreed price and rental value of the land are treated
as equivalent, on the theory that Cwthe use of money and the use of land are held
to balance each other." In some cases it is not clear how this theory of
equivalence was applied; but in the decisions which have given careful
attention to the problem, it has been held that the purchaser will not recover
interest payments actually made, nor will he be allowed interest on the
principal amounts paid.
(footnotes and citations omitted).
Contrary to the trial court's position that Plaintiffs were due no rent because Doms
derived no benefit from the land, the cases clearly hold that the purchaser does not have to
occupy or even use the land for rental value to accrue in favor of the vendor. For example,

15

in Kicks v. State Bank of Lisbon. 98 N.W. 408 (N.D. 1904), the vendor bank sold the
purchaser 80 acres of "wild land, without any house or improvements thereon." Kicks. 98
N.W. at 408. The purchaser farmed the land and made payments, in the form of crops raised
on the land, for eight years. Kicks. 98 N.W. at 409. Eventually, a superior titleholder
foreclosed on the property because the purchaser stopped paying taxes and the bank did
nothing to remedy the non-payment or to perfect its title to protect the purchaser from
foreclosure by the third party. Id The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that the
parties had rescinded their contract by their actions (or, more correctly, inactions). Id. In
determining how the parties could be returned to the pre-contract status quo, given the fact
that much of the proceeds from the land went to payments made by the purchaser to the
bank, the court first stated the general rule that "interest on the purchase money paid and the
use of the land under the contract shall offset each other." Kicks 98 N.W. at 410. Because
the bank did not receive full payment on the land, the court stated:
In this case the whole of the purchase price of the land was not paid by
the vendee, and hence the rule that interest on the purchase price shall balance
the value of the use of the land does not fully compensate the defendant for the
use of his land. But the plaintiff, while breaking and preparing the land for
crops, received no benefit from the land as a matter of fact. . . . To allow her
the use of the land, and the defendant the use of the money without interest,
is as practical and just an adjustment of the mutual rights of the parties as can
be made under the evidence submitted in the case. To allow her interest on
what she paid and the free use of the land would not be such an adjustment as
contemplated by the rule that the parties are to be placed in statu quo.
Kicks. 98 N.W. at 411. The court then ordered return of the sums paid by the purchaser and
disallowing all interest on those monies. Here as in Kicks, the purchase price of the land had
not and has not been paid in full. Doms should not receive either a return of the interest
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payments or interest on the principal because those monies, at least partially, offset rent.
In Elrod-Oas Home Bldg. Co. v. Mensor, 8 P.2d 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 1932), the vendor
sold a house to the purchaser for small down payment and monthly payments. 8 P.2d at 171.
While the purchasers had possession of the house for eighteen months, they only lived in the
house for 10 months. 8 P.2d at 172. After subsequent disputes between the parties, vendors
brought an action to quiet title while the purchasers cross-claimed seeking rescission. Id.
In seeking to return the parties to the status quo, the trial court awarded vendors rent for only
those months which the purchasers actually lived on the property. Id The California Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court's determination as to the period for which rent should be
awarded. It stated:
While [purchasers] actually occupied the premises for about ten months, and
this owing to the fact that the business of the husband required them to reside
elsewhere during the rest of the period, nevertheless they held undisturbed
possession for eighteen months. The whole period should, we think, have
been allowed for at the monthly rate impliedly admitted by defendants and
found to be reasonable . . . .
Elrod-Oas Home Bldg. Co., 8 P.2d at 173. Even in the case where purchasers derived no
benefit from the property, they were responsible for rents by virtue of the fact that they held
the exclusive right of possession of the property.
As both Kicks and Elrod-Oas illustrate, the purchaser need not derive a benefit from
land in order to liable to the vendor for rents upon rescission. The fact that the purchaser had
exclusive control and right to the property is sufficient to make him responsible regardless
of the use made of the property by the purchaser. Indeed, if the award of rent was dependent
of the use made of the property, a purchaser could buy a home, hold possession of it for a
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number of years but never occupy it, rescind if an encroachment were later found to exist,
and be liable for no rent because the purchaser derived no benefit from the property. This
would be an intolerable situation. Here, the trial court was wrong when it determined that
the Rossi Hills had no rental value because it was "raw ground" from which Doms derived
no benefit.
Finally, as Plaintiffs stated in their opening brief, Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants
at 33-34, the trial court should have ordered Doms to pay rental value for the land for the
extended period for which nothing was paid under the trust deed note. The cases clearly
reach the conclusion that the purchaser is responsible for the rental value for the property for
the entire period for which the purchaser had possession of the land regardless of the use
made of the land by the purchaser. For example, as stated above, the purchasers in ElrodOas Home Bldg. Co., were required to pay rent even for the period which they did not live
in the house.
The reasoning for requiring the purchaser to responsible for rent for the entire period
is found in Kunde v. O'Brian, 243 N.W. 594 (Iowa 1932). There, as here, purchasers had
possession of property for several years after they stopped making required payments.
Kunde, 243 N.W. at 594. In returning the parties to the status quo after rescission based on
an encroachment on the property which had not been reported by the vendor, the trial court
awarded the vendor rent for the entire period that the purchasers were in possession of the
property plus interest on the rental payments. Kunde, 243 N.W. at 595. In rejecting the
purchasers' argument that their responsibility for rent payments should have stopped when
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the encroachment was discovered, the Iowa Supreme Court stated:
If it had not been for the contract, [vendor], theoretically speaking,
would have had the rentals from the premises during all the period
[purchasers] were in possession thereof under the contract. How, then, can
[vendor] be placed in statu quo, unless she had the equivalent of her right to
the property during the period the [purchasers] were in possession thereof, to
wit, the rentals therefrom during the time. These rentals would have been
received by [vendor], had it not been for the contract, each month during the
period in question. Accordingly, to place the [vendor] in statu quo, it is
necessary that she have rent for each month, together with interest thereon at
6 per cent from the accruing date. Otherwise, [vendor] would not be placed
in the position she would have been in had there been no contract.
Kunde, 243 N.W. at 596.
Here, Plaintiffs cannot be restored to the status quo unless they receive rent for the
property, as ordered by this Court, for the entire period Doms has had exclusive possession
of the property. As Plaintiff argued in the trial court, the appropriate measure of rent is, as
a number of cases suggest, the value of the interest payments made (and should have been
made) on the purchase money and the taxes. The trial court's conclusion that Rossi Hills is
wC

raw ground" and therefore, had no rental value is against the weight of authority which

clearly states that rent is to be awarded regardless of the benefit derived by the purchaser.

POINT V
(Reply to Defendant's Point (5))
THE "LAW OF THE CASE" SAYS NOTHING ABOUT A REFUND OF
TAX PAYMENTS. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT AWARDED
TAX PAYMENTS TO DOMS.
In their opening brief, Plaintiffs argued that the trial court should not have refunded
the taxes paid on the property by Doms. In response, Doms claims that taxes were part of
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the "net payments j>aid by him" and that the cases cited by Plaintiffs do not support
Plaintiffs'position. Reply Brief of Defendant at 19-20.
With respect to Doms' claim that tax payments are part of the net payments paid by
Doms. the record contains no evidence that Doms was the specific source of the any or all
of the payments. Since this Court \ i ilci i\ I ihai I )nms receive only the "net payments paid
by him", unless Doms was the source of the payments, he is not nil i( In.1 to t heir return. As
Doms readily admits the parties should be returned to their original positions, Reply Brief
of Defendant at 19, not a position better than that originally occupied. To return payments
that Doms did not make, either personally or by giving value for the corporation, would be
to give him a windfall - it would not restore him to the pre-contract status quo.
Doms also attacks the cases Plaintiff cited in support of the argument that he should
not have received a refund of the tax payments. As VI intiffs stated in their opening brief
at 35, the courts in Libassi v. ChellL 615 N.Y.S.2d 75, 77 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994), and
Bechard v.Bolton, 24 N. W.2d 422,423 (Mich. 1946), each made decisions that vendors who
were not in possession of the property at the time tax liability was incurred should not be
responsible for that tax liability.2 Significantly, while he conlplains that Libassi and Bechard

2

Doms tries to make much of the fact that the buyer in Libassi in essence admitted to
committing fraud in inducing the seller to sell the property. While this is correct, this did not
seem to play a significant role in apportioning which party should bear the burden of the tax
payments. Indeed, the court simply stated that the buyer should bear the burden of the tax
payments because the buyer was in possession of the property when the obligation was
incurred.
Doms attempts to distinguish Bechard on the basis that the court there determined that
the interest and taxes paid by the buyer equaled the rental value. As Plaintiffs argued in
Point IV, that determination was avoided by the trial court in this case, when it refused to
20

should not apply to this case, he cites no cases for the position that taxes should not be paid
by the possessor of the land at the time the tax obligation was incurred. The proposition has
received more general support. For example, 1 George E. Palmer, The Law of Restitution,
§ 4.18(c), at 524 (1978), states, "In some cases the purchaser has obtained restitution of the
taxes paid on the land, whereas in others tax payments as well as interest have been set off
against rental value."3 Therefore, Doms, who was in possession of the property at the time
the obligation was incurred, should not have been refunded tax payments made during his
occupancy.

POINT VI
(Reply to Defendant's Point (6))
THE ISSUE OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IS PROPERLY BEFORE
THIS COURT. IT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED.
In their opening brief, Plaintiffs asserted that the trial court incorrectly gave Doms
pre-judgment interest. In response, Doms claims that the issue was not raised in the trial
court and, in any event, he is entitled to pre-judgment interest. Reply Br. of Def. at 20-24.
Doms' claim that this issue was not raised in the trial court is false. In Plaintiffs'
award payment of rent to the Plaintiffs and thus, defied the order of this Court. Had the trial
court made the determination required of it, it may well have determined that here, as in
Bechard, interest and taxes paid by Doms would equal the rental value of the property.
3

The only case cited in The Law of Restitution for the proposition that taxes may be
recovered by a purchaser, Skinner v. Scholes, 229 N.W. 114 (N.D. 1930), does not include
any reasoning as to why taxes were refunded. In that case, despite the fact that taxes were
returned to the purchaser on rescission, the court declined to give the purchaser interest on
the taxes. 229 N.W. at 117. Therefore, at the very least, the award of interest to Doms for
taxes ostensibly paid by him w7as without legal support and should be reversed.
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Memorandum m Opposition i<

•

s Motion to Enter Judgment, Point IE clearly

states, "Doms should not receive any interest whi

-"dates this Court's current

judgement." (R. 8734) The argument contained in the ensuing page and half parallels the
issue as presented nil laintiffs' opening brief on this appeal. Therefore, this issue is properly
before this Court.
In the rest of his response, Doms assails the primary case cited by Plaintiffs, Bellon
v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991). Doms claims that Bellon does not stand for the
proposition that "prejudgmer

awarded in equity cases such as this ..." Reply

Brief of Defendant at 21. This claim, like that concerning the preservation of the issue, is
false. In Bellon, a case in which assignees of a defaulting buyer sued the seller for equitable
restitution of payments made prior to the buyer's default and forfeiture, the Utah Supreme
Court stated, "No case has been cited to us where we have aP-

. u prejudgment interest in

an action as the instant case, which is for equitable relief." 808 P.2d at 1097. Doms admits
that Bellon has m i been overruled but cites a case which he claims qualifies it, Cornia v.
Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379 (Utah 1995). Hi I N>IH'. mUsi also admit that Cornia did not allow
prejudgment interest. Reply Brief of Defendant at 21-22. In short, Doms cites no case in
which supports the award of prejudgment interest.4

4

At the end of the argument on this point, Doms raises a claim that he is entitled to
prejudgment interest under Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1. Reply Brief of Defendant at 24.
However, that statute provides for interest only pursuant to a contract. It states:
(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest
for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action that is the
subject of their contract.
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Prejudgment interest is not appropriate because such an award requires that the
principal amount be capable of being determined with mathematical accuracy. Shoreline
Devel. Co. v. Utah County. 835 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In equity cases, the
final ascertainment of damages is usually a question of fact and, as such, is not capable of
being determined with mathematical certainty. Id In this case, the disposition of the interest
payments made on the purchase money, the taxes and the rent were all incapable of
ascertainment until the trial judge ruled. For example, upon rescission, an equitable claim
arose in favor of Plaintiffs for the value of the use of the land, which the trial court could
have, and should have, set off against Doms' claim. However, such equitable claim was
uncertain until it became liquidated, either by agreement of the parties or by entry of
judgment. Until that occurred the principal sum could not be calculated with any degree of
certainty. On this basis alone, prejudgment interest should not have been awarded.

CONCLUSION
This court gave the trial court a very clear mandate in Anderson II which included

(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of
interest, the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money,
goods, or chose in action shall be 10% per annum.
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to affect any
penalty or interest charge that by law applies to delinquent or other taxes or to
any contract or obligations made before May 14, 1981.
This statute does not apply to this case because Doms cannot claim a benefit under a contract
which he has disavowed by seeking (and obtaining) its rescission. BLT Investment Co. v.
Snow, 586 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah 1976).
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determining whether the parties coi

* restored to the pre-contract status quo and, if that

was possible, how it should be done. As part of the potential

i to the pre-contract status

quo, this Court, knowing the property at issue was undeveloped land, ordered the trial court
to award rent to the Plaintiffs. The trial failed to implement the order of this Court. This
failure will mean that, under the trial court's current order, the parties will not be restored
to their pre-contract status quo.
Therefore, Plaintiffs request that this Court:
(1) affirm that portion of the trial court's decision which denies Doms a refund of interest
paid under the Trust Deed Note, and/or
(2) reverse the trial court's refusal to examine issues concerning whether rescission is
appropriate and remand the case to the trial court for a determination of whether the parties
can be restored to their pre-contract positions, and/or
(3) if rescission is appropriate, reverse the trial court's refusal to address the allocation of
rights and responsibilities and remand > the trial court for a determination of the rights and
responsibilities of the parties, and/or
(4) reverse the trial court's refusal to award fair rental value of the property to the Plaintiffs
and remand to the trial court for a determination of the fair rental value, and/or
(5) reverse the trial court's award of a refund of taxes to Doms, and/or
(6) reverse the trial court's award of prejudgment interest to Doms.
DATED this

day of November, 2002.
Respectfully submitted,
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